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Home-Biased Analysts in Emerging Markets
Sandy Lai and Melvyn Teo∗
Abstract
We find that local analyst recommendations are systematically more optimistic than for-
eign analyst recommendations in emerging markets. The effects of this novel “home bias”
among local analysts overwhelm any information asymmetry between foreign and local
analysts. Consequently, local analyst upgrades underperform foreign analyst upgrades,
while local analyst downgrades outperform foreign analyst downgrades. Neither foreign
investors, local institutions, nor retail investors appear to be fully cognizant of this bias.
Trade reactions suggest that foreign investors overestimate the bias in foreign analyst rec-
ommendations while local institutions underestimate the bias in local analyst recommen-
dations. These results are pervasive across countries, time periods, and stock groupings,
and can be traced to investment banking pressure.
I. Introduction
The financial press in developed markets is rife with reports of conflicts of
interests among sell-side analysts. For example, “Did Wall Street Really Learn
Its Lesson?” which appeared in The New York Times on April 9, 2006, challenges
the view that the high profile investigations in 2001 led by New York State At-
torney General Eliot Spitzer have curtailed the tendency of sell-side analysts to
issue optimistic recommendation reports. Yet, in emerging markets, such as Asia,
one finds scant anecdotal evidence of analyst conflicts of interests. A search of the
global database Factiva over 2005 and 2006 yields only one article1 on the recom-
mendation bias of analysts in the region. Therefore, there seems to be less focus
on conflicts of interests among analysts in emerging markets. Yet, the underlying
drivers behind analyst optimism, such as investment banking pressure,2 may be
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1The search was based on the keyword phrase “asia and analysts and investment banking and bias.”
The article, “Analyzing the Analysts—Brokerages Get Screened,” from The Business Times Singapore
on January 4, 2005, noted that there was “an institutional bias towards buy recommendations.”
2The agency issue here is that because sell-side analysts work for investment banks and brokerage
houses, they may feel pressured to generate optimistic recommendations to support their firms’ efforts
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stronger with local analysts than with foreign analysts in these markets. For exam-
ple, articles such as “Funds Raised by Taiwan’s Firms via Banks,” which appeared
in Taiwan Economic News on July 6, 2006, and “DBS Still Tops in Capital Mar-
kets Here,” from The Business Times Singapore on January 9, 2006, suggest that
local underwriters dominate in the region. Hence, the analysts working for these
local underwriters may be even more optimistic than their foreign counterparts.
This paper sheds light on the recommendation biases of local and foreign
analysts on emerging market stocks. Using data from eight emerging Asian coun-
tries3 between 1994 and 2003, we find that domestic equity issues in emerging
Asian markets are dominated by local underwriters. In every country, at least 78%
(by number) and 69% (by market capitalization) of the equity issues are managed
by local underwriters. To the extent that this is symptomatic of cultural and lan-
guage barriers facing foreign underwriters or of the less lucrative nature of under-
writing in emerging countries, it suggests that local analysts face much stronger
investment banking pressures than do foreign analysts in these markets. We then
test for systematic differences in recommendation optimism between local and
foreign analysts. If, as argued by Michaely and Womack (1999) and others, in-
vestment banking pressures are responsible for sell-side analyst recommendation
optimism, then we should observe greater optimism among local analysts. We
find that the difference in optimism between local and foreign analyst recommen-
dations is positive and statistically significant (t-statistic = 14.00). In addition,
it is robust across countries and time periods, and pervasive across small, large,
value, growth, index, and non-index stocks.
Next, we compare the post-announcement returns of local versus foreign
analyst recommendations. If investment banking pressure is the main driver be-
hind differences in local and foreign analyst recommendations, then we should
observe that local upgrades underperform foreign upgrades while local down-
grades outperform foreign downgrades. On the other hand, if foreigners are
the smarter players in emerging markets, as advanced in Seasholes (2006) and
Richards (2005), foreign analyst upgrades and downgrades should outperform
local analyst upgrades and downgrades. Conversely, the reverse should prevail
if local informational advantages dominate in emerging markets (Dvorak (2005)
and Choe, Kho, and Stulz (2005)). We find that the difference in recommendation
optimism translates to differences in announcement day returns. Foreign analyst
buy recommendations reliably outperform local analyst buy recommendations by
24 basis points (t-statistic = 3.82) on the announcement day. Conversely, local an-
alyst sell recommendations reliably outperform foreign analyst sell recommenda-
tions by −22 basis points (t-statistic = −2.18) on the announcement day. Similar
results are obtained with upgrades and downgrades.
To examine long-term recommendation performance, we adopt a calendar
time portfolio approach and show that after controlling for return covariation with
Fama and French’s (1993) three factors, local analyst upgrades underperform for-
eign analyst upgrades by 3 basis points per day or 7.2% annualized, while local
analyst downgrades outperform foreign analyst downgrades by −5.9 basis points
per day or −14.2% annualized. These results echo those of Barber, Lehavy, and
3These countries include India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and
Thailand.
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Trueman (2007) who find that analysts facing greater investment banking pres-
sure, i.e., those working for investment banks, generate upgrades (downgrades)
that are less (more) informative than analysts facing less investment banking pres-
sure, i.e., those working for independent research firms. The results also indicate
that the recommendation performance differences that we observe cannot be sim-
ply traced to smarter foreign analysts or to a local informational advantage.
To further investigate the link between investment banking pressure and the
difference in recommendation optimism between local and foreign analysts, we
test whether in controlling for underwriter affiliation, the optimism difference is
increasing in the aggregate investment banking deal flow and in the proportion
of that flow directed toward underwriters from the country where the analyst is
based. We find that local analysts are even more optimistic than foreign analysts
when the local equity issue market is hot or when many investment banking deals
are managed by local underwriters. Variation in these country-specific investment
banking proxies can completely explain away optimism differences between local
and foreign analysts. In contrast, other explanations, including the view that local
analysts are under greater pressure to generate commissions (Jackson (2005)), that
foreign analysts cover stocks with greater institutional presence that in turn serves
as a disciplining device (Ljungqvist, Marston, Starks, Wei, and Yan (2007)), that
foreign analysts have better reputations to safeguard (Stickel (1992)), that for-
eign analysts shade their recommendations to account for currency and country
risk, that familiarity bias breeds greater optimism among locals (Bailey, Kumar,
and Ng (2006)), and that local analysts suffer from the selection (McNichols and
O’Brien (1997)) and cognitive biases (Kahneman and Lovallo (1993)) induced by
underwriter affiliation, do not account for the bulk of the optimism differences.4
To gauge the ability of investors to unravel the recommendation optimism of
local and foreign analysts, we evaluate the trade reaction of local retail investors,
local institutions, and foreign investors to analyst recommendation announce-
ments. Given our announcement day return results, if investors recognize the full
extent of the bias in analyst recommendations, they should sell more following lo-
cal analyst sells/downgrades than they buy following local analyst buys/upgrades.
Conversely, they should buy more following foreign analyst buys/upgrades than
they sell following foreign analyst sells/downgrades. Moreover, they should buy
more after foreign analyst buys than after local analyst buys, and sell more after
local analyst sells than after foreign analyst sells.
Using daily trade data from the Korea Stock Exchange, we find that while
foreign investors and local institutions aggressively trade in the correct direction
following analyst recommendation announcements, they do not fully appreciate
the difference in optimism between local and foreign analysts. Foreign investors
trade incorrectly as if foreign analyst sells/downgrades are more informative than
foreign analyst buys/upgrades. In response to foreign analyst sells, foreign in-
vestors sell 2.23 times as much as they buy following foreign analyst buys. They
also sell more following a foreign sell than following a local sell, despite the fact
that the latter conveys more negative information. Local institutions trade incor-
4For instance, analysts from the Institutional Investor All-Asia teams are more optimistic than
other analysts, which is inconsistent with the reputation story in which the better reputation of foreign
analysts drives the lower levels of optimism among foreign analysts.
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rectly as if local analyst buys are more informative than local analyst sells. In
response to local analyst buys, local institutions buy 1.48 times as much as they
sell following local analyst sells. They also buy more following a local buy than
following a foreign buy. In short, foreign investors overestimate the bias in foreign
analyst recommendations while local institutions underestimate the bias in local
analyst recommendations. Our trade reaction results, which are based on Korean
daily trade data, challenge the Morgan Stanley view (The Wall Street Journal, July
14, 1992) that sophisticated investors are able to unravel and correctly assess the
investment banking pressures of sell-side analysts, and dovetail with the view that
investors do not fully recognize the bias in analyst research and are systematically
misled by analyst reports.
This paper contributes to the literature by documenting optimism differences
between local and foreign analysts in emerging markets and linking those differ-
ences to investment banking pressure. While there is a nascent body of work on
international analysts, these studies mainly test for accuracy differences between
local and foreign analyst forecasts and recommendations (see Orpurt (2006), Bae,
Stulz, and Tan (2006), Bacmann and Bolliger (2006), and Chang (2006)). None
of these papers focuses on the optimism differences between local and foreign
recommendations or on the drivers of those differences. Unlike these papers, ours
uncovers a “home bias”5 or a greater tendency to issue optimistic recommenda-
tions among local analysts than among foreign analysts. This study also shows
that agency issues related to analysts’ incentives to attract underwriting business
are an important phenomenon in Asian as well as in U.S. markets.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a
description of the related literature and data. Section III reports the empirical
findings while Section IV discusses the results in light of several competing ex-
planations. Section V concludes.
II. Methodology
A. Related Literature
The link between investment banking and analyst recommendation optimism
is reasonably well established in developed markets. For example, Lin and Mc-
Nichols (1998) report that lead underwriter U.S. analysts issue more favorable
recommendations than unaffiliated U.S. analysts. Moreover, the three-day returns
of the hold recommendations issued by the former are significantly more nega-
tive than those issued by the latter. Along the same lines, Michaely and Womack
(1999) report that in the U.S. initial public offerings (IPOs) for which underwriter
analysts issue buy recommendations underperform IPOs with buy recommenda-
tions from only unaffiliated analysts. This supports the view that underwriters
attempt to boost the stock prices of the firms they have taken public. Similarly,
Barber, Lehavy, and Trueman (2007) find that upgrades from U.S. investment
banks underperform upgrades from independent U.S. research firms, while the
5This “home bias” is reminiscent of but distinct from the traditional home bias, i.e., the prefer-
ence displayed by international investors for local stocks documented by French and Poterba (1991),
Cooper and Kaplanis (1994), and Tesar and Wermer (1995).
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reverse is true for downgrades. They ascribe their results to the greater invest-
ment banking pressures facing investment banks.
Investment banking relations notwithstanding, other factors may also influ-
ence analyst optimism. Jackson (2005), using data from Australia, argues that the
pressure to generate brokerage commissions can induce optimism among sell-
side analysts. Ljungqvist et al. (2007) contend that the presence of institutional
investors moderates conflicts of interest in sell-side research and show that U.S.
analysts issue less optimistic recommendations for U.S. stocks with high institu-
tional ownership. Stickel (1992) finds that reputable Institutional Investor All-
American analysts deliver more accurate forecasts than other analysts. Hence,
reputable analysts may eschew optimism for greater accuracy. Finally, affiliated
analysts may be more biased simply because firms select underwriters who are
more optimistic (McNichols and O’Brien (1997)) or because affiliated analysts
genuinely believe that the firms their banks underwrite are superior to firms un-
derwritten by competing banks (Kahneman and Lovallo (1993)).
In contrast to the large literature on analyst conflicts of interests in devel-
oped markets, little is known about such conflicts of interest in emerging markets.
Most papers on international analysts focus instead on explaining the international
home bias puzzle or the strong preference for local stocks among international in-
vestors (French and Poterba (1991), Cooper and Kaplanis (1994), and Tesar and
Werner (1995)). One possibility for the home bias is that a local informational
advantage exists. However, the extant literature on international investors offers
mixed evidence. For instance, Dvorak (2005), Choe, Kho, and Stulz (2005), and
Hau (2001) report that local investors outperform foreign investors in Indonesia,
Korea, and Germany, respectively. Yet, Seasholes (2006), Froot, O’Connell, and
Seasholes (2001), and Richards (2005) show that foreign investors outperform,
especially in emerging markets.
Adding to this debate, studies on international analysts mainly test for ac-
curacy differences between local and foreign analyst earnings forecasts. Orpurt
(2006) finds that local analysts issue more accurate earnings forecasts than other
analysts in Europe. Consistent with this, Bae, Stulz, and Tan (2006) demonstrate
in their sample of 32 countries that local analysts issue superior earnings fore-
casts, especially in emerging countries where there is less informational disclo-
sure. Conversely, Bacmann and Bolliger (2006) show that foreign analyst fore-
casts outperform local analyst forecasts in Latin American countries. Taking the
middle ground, Chang (2006) reports that in Taiwan, foreign analysts with local
presence issue recommendations that outperform those issued by local and other
foreign analysts. None of these papers, however, contributes to our understanding
of the conflicts of interest issues facing analysts in emerging countries.
B. Data
We cull analyst recommendations data from the Institutional Brokers Es-
timate System (IBES) Detail and Summary Recommendations file. Our sam-
ple covers eight emerging Asian countries—India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia,
Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand—and extends from January 1994
to December 2003. Our choice of eight emerging Asian markets reflects the belief
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that emerging Asian markets are on average larger than emerging Latin American
or East European markets, and they offer a longer time series and wider cross
section of local and foreign analyst recommendations with which to maximize
the power of the tests. Recent studies that focus on emerging Asian countries in-
clude Dvorak (2005), Choe, Kho, and Stulz (2005), Barber, Lee, Liu, and Odean
(2006), and Richards (2005).
In IBES, the Detail Recommendations file provides a data entry for each
recommendation announcement by each sell-side analyst whose brokerage firm
contributes to the database. IBES parlays the original text recommendations to
its own five-point rating system, i.e., 1 (strong buy), 2 (buy), 3 (hold), 4 (under-
perform), and 5 (sell). Unlike in the U.S., where the five-point rating scheme is
widely used, the three-point rating scheme is popular among analysts in interna-
tional markets. Many international analysts rate firms with a buy, hold, or sell
recommendation. In such cases, IBES maps them to 1, 3, and 5, respectively, in
their five-point rating system. Hence, considerably fewer buy and underperform
recommendations are found in our sample compared to the U.S. sample.6 To
make the comparison of recommendations meaningful across analysts, we aggre-
gate IBES ratings 1 and 2 as buy, and 4 and 5 as sell throughout the study. Also,
to facilitate the interpretation of our results, we assign the values 1, 2, and 3 to
sell, hold, and buy recommendations, respectively.7
The IBES Summary file provides a monthly summary for each firm cov-
ered in the database, with the number of outstanding ratings and the mean and
the median of those ratings available on a monthly basis. We measure recom-
mendation optimism as the difference between an analyst’s recommendation and
the current month’s median consensus for the firm. The results using the mean
consensus are virtually identical. Our regression analysis on recommendation
optimism excludes recommendations with consensus levels generated from less
than three recommendations. We do so because consensus levels generated from
few recommendations are noisy and may not be representative of consensus be-
lief among analysts. We classify each brokerage firm as either local or foreign
depending on the location of the firm’s headquarters. For each stock traded in
country x, a brokerage firm is classified as local if it is headquartered in country
x. It is classified as foreign otherwise. We obtain the headquarter information
for each brokerage firm by hand from stock exchanges, securities and exchange
commissions, and company Web sites.8
6Of the analyst recommendations in our eight-country universe, the proportion of strong buys,
buys, holds, underperforms, and sells are 32%, 14%, 31%, 7%, and 16%, respectively. In the U.S.,
however, the corresponding proportions are 27%, 34%, 34%, 3%, and 2%, respectively, during the
sample period. Clearly, there is a dearth of buys and underperforms in the IBES emerging market
stock universe.
7Our results are robust to using the five-point rating system in place of the three-point rating
system.
8The Jakarta Stock Exchange, Philippine Stock Exchange, and Singapore Monetary Authority
provide a comprehensive list of brokerage firms that conduct business in the respective countries,
including business and address information. In addition, we use information on the exchange member
lists obtained from other stock exchanges and information on company Web sites to distinguish local
from foreign brokerages.
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We employ daily return data from Datastream to examine the returns from
following local and foreign analyst recommendations.9 We adjust for market re-
turns using the daily Datastream total market indices for each country. Further,
we match firms in IBES with those in Datastream using the IBES ticker symbol.
Datastream only maintains a list of IBES ticker symbols for firms that are cur-
rently covered by IBES. For those firms in Datastream that are no longer covered
by IBES, we manually match those using company names. We are able to match
91% of the firms in our IBES universe. The unmatched firms account for roughly
5% of the recommendations in our sample. Excluding them, we are left with
139,504 recommendations.
Table 1 presents summary statistics from our analyst recommendations data.
Panel A reports the statistics for local and foreign analyst groups by country over
the entire sample period. Panel B reports the statistics by subperiod. A few points
are noteworthy. First, the eight emerging Asian markets have garnered substan-
tial interest from foreign analysts. There are 74 foreign brokerages over the entire
sample period, which is about two-thirds of the number of local brokerages. How-
ever, the ratio of the number of local to foreign brokerages has increased over the
sample period, reflecting the expansion of the local brokerage industry in these
countries. Second, foreign brokerages cover more firms than local brokerages in
the early years, but the trend has reversed in recent years. On average, the firms
covered by foreign brokerages are smaller than those covered by locals in the
early years but are larger in recent years. Third, foreign brokerages are substan-
tially larger than local brokerages. The number of analysts working for foreign
brokerages worldwide typically exceeds 100, while that for local brokerages is
typically fewer than 30. Fourth, foreign brokerages are responsible for the bulk of
the analyst recommendations in this region, but the proportion of the recommen-
dations issued by local analysts has increased over the sample period.
To control for underwriter affiliation in our tests, we also use Securities Data
Corporation’s (SDC) equity issue data, which include managing underwriter(s),
value of shares issued, issue price, and date of listing information, to generate
country-specific investment banking proxies and to determine underwriter affili-
ation. In addition, we supplement the SDC data with IPO data from the Korean
Stock Exchange, KOSDAQ, the Singapore Stock Exchange, the Philippine Stock
Exchange, and Bursa Malaysia.
Finally, to investigate how investors react to analyst recommendations, we
collect daily trading data for firms listed on the Korea Stock Exchange. We are
not able to obtain trading data for the other seven countries because they are not
publicly available. The advantage of the Korean dataset is that it allows us to un-
ambiguously distinguish trades by investor type and thereby examine their trade
reactions to analyst recommendations. The exchange labels investors as i) securi-
ties companies, ii) insurance companies, iii) investment trusts, iv) banks, v) other
finance companies, vi) funds, vii) individuals, viii) foreigners, or ix) others. For
our purposes, we aggregate the first six types of investors and refer to them as
9We use both the active and inactive stock files from Datastream to mitigate survivorship bias. In
view of the practice that Datastream sets the return as a constant after a stock ceases trading, we treat
those constant values as missing values in the inactive data file. In addition, to avoid recording errors
in Datastream, we treat daily holding period returns that are greater than 100% as missing values.
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TABLE 1
Summary Statistics
Panel A of Table 1 reports the summary statistics for local and foreign brokerages in the eight countries we study from
January 1994 through December 2003. Panel B reports the same set of statistics for subperiods. Number of Brokerages
refers to the total number of brokerages making recommendations during the period. Number of Firms Covered refers to
the total number of firms covered by each analyst group. Time-series and cross-sectional averages of year-end market
capitalization (in USD millions) of firms covered by analysts are also reported. Number of Firms Covered per Analyst
refers to the average number of firms covered by each analyst. Number of Analysts per Brokerage refers to the average
number of worldwide analysts working for the brokerage. Analyst Experience denotes the average number of years an
analyst has been covering the country since 1994. Number of Analyst Recommendations refers to the total number of
recommendations made by the analyst group.
Number Average Number of Number of Analyst Number of
Number of of Firms Firm Size Firms Covered Analysts Experience Analyst
Brokerages Covered (millions/USD) per Analyst per Brokerage (years) RecommendationsCountry/
Time
Periods Local Foreign Local Foreign Local Foreign Local Foreign Local Foreign Local Foreign Local Foreign
Panel A. Sample Statistics by Country
India 22 31 330 407 783 704 4 5 7 167 1.7 2.1 2,932 9,719
Indonesia 8 37 164 195 552 494 5 4 5 151 2.1 2.3 1,863 8,434
Korea 30 31 1,038 567 394 793 9 4 15 183 1.8 2.0 17,935 10,211
Malaysia 16 52 334 364 809 754 7 5 9 116 2.4 2.6 7,658 18,764
Philippines 5 37 98 125 937 514 8 4 3 154 1.9 2.1 800 8,398
Singapore 13 44 354 321 889 1,056 5 4 24 136 2.8 2.2 7,553 13,962
Taiwan 9 33 380 439 1,623 1,353 7 4 15 172 1.6 1.9 2,535 10,957
Thailand 6 45 211 439 469 413 7 5 6 134 1.7 2.3 1,906 15,877
Panel B. Sample Statistics by Subperiod
1994–1997 41 53 1,550 2,181 1,035 717 6 6 21 113 1.8 1.9 9,552 40,619
1998–2000 51 52 1,841 1,483 696 763 8 5 16 130 2.1 2.3 13,453 28,339
2001–2003 84 33 1,880 1,331 668 815 6 4 14 157 2.1 2.5 20,177 27,364
1994–2003 109 74 2,909 2,858 807 760 7 5 17 131 2.0 2.2 43,182 96,322
domestic institutions. We refer to vii) as domestic retail investors and viii) as for-
eign investors, and we ignore ix). The Korean daily trading data are only available
from January 1, 1995 onward.
As a prelude to analyzing analyst recommendations, we report the number
and total market capitalization of domestic equity issues in the eight emerging
countries grouped by managing underwriter location in Table A1. An equity issue
is classified as Local Lead Underwriter if the sole managing underwriter is local
or if all the joint managing underwriters are local. It is classified as Foreign Lead
Underwriter otherwise. From Table A1, we confirm that domestic equity issues in
emerging Asian markets are dominated by local underwriters. In every country,
at least 78% (by number) and 69% (by market capitalization) of the equity issues
are managed by local underwriters. The equity issue market is least dominated
by local underwriters in Indonesia (possibly reflecting the underdeveloped local
investment banking sector) and most dominated by local underwriters in Taiwan.
The results in Table A1 indicate that emerging market equity issues are typically
managed by local underwriters. This, in turn, points to the presence of cultural
and language barriers facing foreign underwriters or to the less lucrative nature
of underwriting in emerging countries. It also suggests that local analysts face
greater investment banking pressures than do foreign analysts in these markets
III. Empirical Tests
In this section, we explore optimism differences between local and foreign
analyst recommendations. Our analysis is motivated by the dominance of local
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underwriters in the equity issue markets in emerging countries. The dominance
suggests that local analysts face stronger conflicts of interests than do foreign an-
alysts. Hence, we hypothesize that local analyst recommendations are more opti-
mistic than foreign analyst recommendations on emerging market stocks. In ad-
dition, such optimism differences may translate to differences in recommendation
performance. Specifically, because local analysts are more eager to issue upgrades
and more reluctant to issue downgrades, local upgrades should underperform for-
eign upgrades, while local downgrades should outperform foreign downgrades.
Moreover, if international investors are not fully aware of such optimism differ-
ences, then they may have implications on international investor performance as
well.
A. Recommendation Optimism: Local versus Foreign Analysts
The first order of business is to test for optimism differences between local
and foreign analysts. We first examine the distribution of analyst recommen-
dations. We report the number and proportion of analyst recommendations and
recommendation changes for both local and foreign analysts in Table 2. We also
test the null hypothesis that the differences in proportion are each equal to zero
(assuming that all recommendations result from independent decisions). The rec-
ommendation level results in Panel A of Table 2 indicate that local analysts, rel-
ative to foreign analysts, appear to be more reluctant to issue sells than they are
eager to issue buys and holds. The difference in proportion between local and
foreign analyst recommendations is positive for buys and holds, but negative for
sells. These differences are statistically different from zero at the 1% level of
significance.10 We note, however, that the larger differences in proportion for
holds and sells versus buys suggest that local analysts are more reluctant to issue
pessimistic reports than they are eager to issue optimistic reports. For a differ-
ent look at the optimism differences, we also calculate the average/median local
and foreign consensus with the sample of stocks covered by both local and for-
eign analysts. In results not reported, we find that the average local consensus of
2.34 is statistically greater than the average foreign consensus of 2.23 (t-statistic
= 9.58). Similarly, the median local consensus of 2.35 is statistically greater than
the median foreign consensus of 2.27 (t-statistic = 14.59).
One concern is that if local analysts cover stocks with brighter future prospects
than do foreign analysts, this may explain the apparent optimism among the for-
mer. To sidestep coverage issues, we employ the matching algorithm of Lin and
McNichols (1998). For each local analyst recommendation, we find foreign ana-
lyst recommendations on the same stock within 60 days of the recommendation.
10The standard error used in the calculation of the t-statistic for the difference in the proportion of
local buys versus foreign buys is
 
PBL(1− PBL)
nbl + nhl + nsl
+
PBF(1− PBF)
nbf + nhf + nsf
,
where nbl , nhl , nsl, nbf , nhf , and nsf are the number of local buys, local holds, local sells, foreign
buys, foreign holds, and foreign sells, and PBL and PBF are the proportion of local buys and foreign
buys. The standard errors used for the differences in proportion of local versus foreign holds and sells
are calculated analogously.
694 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
TABLE 2
Distribution of Analyst Recommendations
Summary statistics of analyst recommendations broken down by recommendation type. The first two columns report the
number of local and foreign analyst recommendations. The third column reports the proportion of all local recommen-
dations that are buys/holds/sells. The fourth column reports the same statistics for foreign recommendations. The fifth
column reports the difference in proportion for local versus foreign analysts, while the sixth column reports the associated
t-statistic. The sample period is from January 1994 to December 2003.
Number of
Observations Proportion
Recommendation Local Foreign Local Foreign Diff. t-Stat.
Panel A. Full Sample
Buy 20,108 44,080 46.56% 45.76% 0.80% 2.77
Hold 15,426 28,466 35.72% 29.55% 6.17% 22.57
Sell 7,648 23,776 17.71% 24.68% −6.97% −30.28
Panel B. Matched Sample
Buy 10,532 9,959 49.84% 47.13% 2.71% 5.58
Hold 6,825 5,881 32.30% 27.83% 4.47% 10.03
Sell 3,775 5,292 17.86% 25.04% −7.18% −18.04
If there is more than one foreign recommendation, we match the foreign analyst
recommendation that is issued closest to the date of the local analyst recommen-
dation with the local analyst recommendation. If no foreign analyst recommen-
dations are issued within 60 days of the local analyst recommendation, the local
analyst recommendation is removed from the sample. Thus, we control for the
characteristics of firms that local and foreign analysts choose to cover. This al-
gorithm yields a matched sample of 21,132 local and 21,132 foreign analyst rec-
ommendations. We then report the differences for this matched sample of stock
recommendations. The results in Panel B of Table 2 indicate that differences in
coverage cannot explain the greater recommendation optimism of local analysts.
Yet another concern is that other analyst and brokerage attributes may con-
spire to increase (reduce) the recommendation optimism of local (foreign) ana-
lysts. For example, foreign analysts may belong to larger and more established
brokerages. These analysts might then eschew optimism for greater accuracy so as
not to tarnish their stellar reputations. To address this concern, we estimate pooled
cross-sectional regressions on recommendation optimism (recommendation mi-
nus consensus recommendation) with the local analyst dummy as an independent
variable. If local analysts are reliably more optimistic than their foreign counter-
parts, the coefficient estimate on the local analyst dummy should be statistically
positive. To account for the effects that analyst, firm, and brokerage attributes
may have on recommendation optimism, we include the log of firm size, number
of analysts covering the firm, analyst experience, number of firms covered by the
analyst, and brokerage size (which we proxy with the number of analysts issu-
ing recommendations for the brokerage) as controls in the regressions. The firm
characteristics proxy for investment banking and trade generation concerns, while
the analyst characteristics proxy for analyst reputation and career concerns. As
mentioned, brokerage size may capture analyst reputation effects. Firm size may
also proxy for the level of institutional holdings that Ljungqvist et al. (2007) show
has a moderating effect on recommendation optimism because institutions reward
accurate analysts with higher performance ratings. We include yearly and coun-
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try dummies to capture variation in optimism over the sample period and across
countries.
Concretely then, the regressions we estimate include:
OPTi,k,t = a + bLOCALi,t +
∑
yr
hyrYRDUMyrt(1)
+
∑
ctry
jctryCTRYDUMctryk + ξi,k,t,
OPTi,k,t = a + bLOCALi,t + c log(SIZEk,t)(2)
+
∑
yr
hyrYRDUMyrt +
∑
ctry
jctryCTRYDUMctryk + ξi,k,t,
OPTi,k,t = a + bLOCALi,t + c log(SIZEk,t)(3)
+ dNANALYSTk,t + eEXPi,t + fNFIRMi,t
+
∑
yr
hyrYRDUMyrt +
∑
ctry
jctryCTRYDUMctryk + ξi,k,t, and
OPTi,k,t = a + bLOCALi,t + c log(SIZEk,t) + dNANALYSTk,t(4)
+ eEXPi,t + fNFIRMi,t + gBROKERSIZEi,t
+
∑
yr
hyrYRDUMyrt +
∑
ctry
jctryCTRYDUMctryk + ξi,k,t,
where OPTi,k,t is the recommendation optimism (recommendation minus consen-
sus recommendation) for analyst i and firm k in day t, LOCAL is the local analyst
dummy, SIZE is firm size, NANALYST is the number of analysts covering the
firm, EXP is analyst experience in years, NFIRM is the number of firms covered
by the analyst, BROKERSIZE is the brokerage size proxied by the number of an-
alysts issuing recommendations for the brokerage, YRDUMyr is the dummy for
year, yr,11 and CTRYDUMctry is the dummy for country, ctry. For completeness,
we also present results for the corresponding set of regressions without the yearly
and country dummies, and for the matched sample as well.
The results reported in Panel A of Table 3 provide strong evidence that local
analysts are more optimistic than foreign analysts. The OLS coefficient estimates
on the local analyst dummy are positive and statistically significant12 for all re-
gression models. This is true whether we include the yearly and country dum-
mies. Because the standard deviation of the OPT variable is 0.88, the coefficient
estimate for the most comprehensive equation (4) regression indicates that local
analysts are 0.12 standard deviations more optimistic than foreign analysts. The
only other independent variables that also display statistical significance across
all model specifications and for both the full and matched sample are firm size,
number of firms covered by analysts, yearly dummies, and country dummies.
The reliably negative effect that firm size exerts on recommendation optimism is
11We also perform regressions without yearly dummies but with observations clustered by year and
obtain qualitatively similar results. We thank Mark Seasholes for this suggestion.
12Statistical significance is measured using White (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard
errors. As additional robustness tests, we also reestimate the regressions using FGLS and MLE with
firm-wide heteroskedasticity, as well as calculate the standard errors using the bootstrap. The results
are very similar to these alternative specifications.
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consistent with the view expounded by Ljungqvist et al. (2007) that the level of
institutional holdings has a moderating effect on recommendation optimism. The
negative coefficients on the number of firms covered by the analyst variable may
reflect a familiarity bias (Bailey, Kumar, and Ng (2006)) among analysts. The
pattern of coefficient estimates on the yearly dummies accords with simple in-
tuition. The coefficient estimates for the 1997 and 2000 dummies are large and
statistically negative, reflecting the prevailing negative sentiment at the height of
the Asian financial crisis13 and at the end of the technology bubble, respectively.
Conversely, the coefficient estimates for the 1998 and 1999 dummies are large
and statistically positive reflecting the positive sentiment during the technology
bubble.
TABLE 3
Regressions on Analyst Recommendation Optimism
Pooled OLS regressions are estimated from January 1994 to December 2003 across all analyst recommendation/firm
observations in the sample at that time. The dependent variable is analyst recommendation minus this month’s median
recommendation. Observations with consensus generated with less than three observations are excluded from the anal-
ysis. The recommendation variable takes the following values: 3 = buy, 2 = hold, and 1 = sell. Analyst experience is
measured in years. All numbers for analysts and firms are in hundreds. The coefficients on the intercept and the country
and yearly dummies are suppressed for brevity. The number of observations for each full sample equation (1) regression
is 126,708. The number of observations for all of the other full sample regressions is 121,379. The t-statistics derived
using White (1980) standard errors are in parentheses. ˆ = significant at the 10% level, * = significant at the 5% level, and
** = significant at the 1% level.
Without Country With Full Set of Country
or Yearly Dummies and Yearly Dummies
Independent
Variable Eq. (1) Eq. (2) Eq. (3) Eq. (4) Eq. (1) Eq. (2) Eq. (3) Eq. (4)
Panel A. Full Sample
Local analyst dummy 0.145** 0.113** 0.121** 0.109** 0.145** 0.116** 0.116** 0.104**
(27.76) (20.65) (21.21) (15.98) (24.92) (19.13) (18.78) (14.00)
Log of firm size −0.051** −0.052** −0.052** −0.048** −0.033** −0.033**
(−28.27) (−24.77) (−24.61) (−25.53) (−13.94) (−13.87)
Analyst experience 0.001 0.002 −0.005** −0.005**
(0.95) (1.07) (−3.20) (−3.14)
Number of firms −0.021** −0.022** −0.021** −0.022**
covered by analyst (−4.89) (−5.13) (−4.67) (−4.91)
Number of analysts −0.007 −0.004 −0.620** −0.619**
covering firm (−0.16) (−0.09) (−11.77) (−11.76)
Number of analysts −0.006** −0.005**
in brokerage (−3.39) (−2.87)
Panel B. Matched Sample
Local analyst dummy 0.109** 0.111** 0.118** 0.113** 0.109** 0.111** 0.116** 0.115**
(12.68) (12.59) (13.07) (9.31) (12.74) (12.65) (12.89) (9.47)
Log of firm size −0.049** −0.056** −0.056** −0.047** −0.031** −0.031**
(−15.13) (−14.69) (−14.68) (−13.94) (−7.32) (−7.32)
Analyst experience 0.000 0.000 −0.007* −0.007*
(0.01) (0.01) (−2.54) (−2.54)
Number of firms −0.027** −0.027** −0.024** −0.024**
covered by analyst (−3.79) (−3.83) (−3.25) (−3.24)
Number of analysts 0.202** 0.203** −0.609** −0.609**
covering firm (2.75) (2.76) (−6.65) (−6.65)
Number of analysts −0.003 0.000
in brokerage (−0.65) (−0.07)
13To check that the Asian financial crisis does not unduly affect the results, we reestimate the
regressions in Table 3 without the 1997 observations. The results are robust to dropping the 1997
observations from the sample.
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To sidestep coverage issues, we repeat the regression analysis on the sam-
ple of matched recommendations. The regression estimates on the local analyst
dummy in Panel B of Table 3 indicate that coverage differences do not drive our
results.14 To get a sense of the robustness of the results across countries and time
periods, we reestimate the regressions for the last two model specifications (equa-
tions (3) and (4)) by country and by subperiod for the following periods: 1994–
1997, 1998–2000, and 2001–2003. The results in Table 4 reveal that local analysts
are more optimistic than foreign analysts for most countries and for all subperi-
ods. Moreover, the difference in recommendation optimism is statistically greater
than zero for six of the eight countries (under equation (4)) and for all subperiods.
Consistent with the investment banking story, one of the two countries without
more optimistic local analysts, i.e., Indonesia, is also the country where local un-
derwriters dominate the least (see Table A1). Interestingly, while the introduction
of measures by the U.S. Securities Exchange Commission in 2000 to regulate the
analyst industry and the resulting increased media scrutiny on analysts have di-
minished the overall optimism level in the U.S. (Barber, Lehavy, McNichols, and
Trueman (2006)), they have not diminished the optimism of local analysts relative
to that of foreign analysts in emerging markets. The difference in optimism has
remained fairly stable over the entire sample period.
There may be concerns that the optimism differences we uncover are con-
fined to certain stocks. If, for example, the optimism differences are restricted
to small and non-index stocks, our study may not be relevant to institutional in-
vestors who typically trade large index stocks. To address these concerns, we split
the sample of firm observations into equal number groups by firm size and by the
firm book-to-market ratio, and we reestimate the equation (3) and equation (4)
regressions for each subsample separately. We do the same for stocks that belong
to the MSCI World Free Index and those that do not belong to that index. The co-
efficients on the local analyst dummy and their t-statistics reported in Panel A of
Table 5 make clear that the optimism differences are pervasive and robust across
index, non-index, small, large, value, and growth stocks.
In addition, we examine the optimism differences for recommendations strat-
ified by brokerage type. Specifically, we test whether the effects are confined to
large brokerages that employ many analysts or to small brokerages that employ
a few analysts. We also check whether the optimism differences are more acute
with foreign analysts whose brokerages have a local presence or with foreign
analysts whose brokerages do not have a local presence, and whether the opti-
mism differences apply to U.S.-based or to non-U.S.-based foreign brokerages.
The results in Panel B of Table 5 suggest that the optimism differences persist
across brokerage types. In particular, the optimism differences are statistically
significant with analysts from large brokerages who presumably have higher abil-
ity and with analysts from small brokerages who presumably have lower ability.
14In the matched sample, the coefficient estimate on the NANALYST variable changes its sign and
significance depending on the inclusion of the year and country dummies. We find that this is mostly
because in 1997, during the Asian financial crisis, the number of analysts covering each firm is very
low and the average level of optimism is also low. To check this, we reestimate the equation (4)
regression with full country dummies and a dummy for a particular year in the sample period. We do
so 10 times, i.e., once for each year in the sample period. We find that NANALYST changes sign from
positive to negative only when we include the dummy for 1997.
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TABLE 4
Recommendation Optimism of Local versus Foreign Analysts by Country and Subperiod
Coefficient estimates on the local analyst dummy from country by country and subperiod by subperiod OLS regressions
are estimated from January 1994 to December 2003 across all analyst recommendation/firm observations in the sample at
that time. The dependent variable is analyst recommendation minus this month’s median recommendation. Observations
with consensus generated with less than three observations are excluded from the analysis. The recommendation variable
takes the following values: 3 = buy, 2 = hold, and 1 = sell. The independent variables in equation (3) include local analyst
dummy, log of firm size, analyst experience in years, number of firms covered per analyst, and number of analysts covering
firm. Equation (4) includes, in addition, the independent variable number of analysts in the brokerage. The t-statistics
derived using White (1980) standard errors are in parentheses. ˆ = significant at the 10% level, * = significant at the 5%
level, and ** = significant at the 1% level.
Full Sample Matched Sample
Country/ Number Number
Subperiod of Obs. Eq. (3) Eq. (4) of Obs. Eq. (3) Eq. (4)
Panel A. Country by Country Regressions
India 10,518 −0.037 0.120** 3,799 0.012 0.125*
(−1.48) (3.45) (0.30) (2.15)
Indonesia 9,000 0.015 0.012 2,598 −0.022 −0.003
(0.59) (0.44) (−0.61) (−0.08)
Korea 22,538 0.108** 0.087** 8,004 0.112** 0.105**
(6.98) (3.67) (5.07) (3.14)
Malaysia 24,748 0.174** 0.156** 9,636 0.197** 0.228**
(13.36) (10.27) (10.51) (9.12)
Philippines 8,389 0.467** 0.445** 1,206 0.469** 0.477**
(13.02) (11.99) (7.89) (5.48)
Singapore 19,803 0.134** 0.130** 8,765 0.137** 0.131**
(10.11) (8.20) (7.50) (5.47)
Taiwan 11,417 0.165** 0.132** 2,852 0.165** 0.107*
(7.21) (4.81) (4.29) (2.00)
Thailand 14,966 0.000 −0.017 2,245 −0.046 −0.031
(0.01) (−0.53) (−1.06) (−0.56)
Panel B. Subperiod by Subperiod Regressions
1994–1997 42,051 0.118** 0.071** 11,767 0.132** 0.096**
(10.17) (5.47) (8.25) (4.56)
1998–2000 37,467 0.117** 0.125** 13,105 0.104** 0.126**
(9.94) (9.00) (6.28) (5.45)
2001–2003 41,861 0.110** 0.112** 14,233 0.103** 0.105**
(11.30) (9.06) (7.17) (5.22)
The coefficient estimates in columns three and four of Panel B also indicate that
the optimism difference between local and foreign analysts with local presence is
smaller than that between local and foreign analysts without local presence. This
in turn suggests that among foreign analysts, those with local presence are more
optimistic than those without local presence. One reason may be that foreign
brokerages with a local presence get a disproportionate amount of the underwrit-
ing business allocated to foreign brokerages. We also find that U.S. analysts are
more optimistic than non-U.S. foreign analysts, though U.S. analysts are still less
optimistic relative to local analysts.
B. Recommendation Performance
In this section, we test the implications of the relative optimism uncovered in
the previous section on the cumulative market-adjusted abnormal returns follow-
ing local and foreign analyst recommendations. We analyze the returns accruing
to the stocks that have buy, hold, or sell recommendations as well as stocks that
have been upgraded to a buy or downgraded to a sell. Our analysis focuses on the
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TABLE 5
Recommendation Optimism of Local versus Foreign Analysts by Firm and Brokerage Type
Pooled OLS regressions are estimated from January 1994 to December 2003 across all analyst recommendation/firm
observations in samples broken down by firm and brokerage type. The dependent variable is analyst recommendation
minus this month’s median recommendation. Observations with consensus generated with less than three observations
are excluded from the analysis. In the equation (3) regressions, the independent variables are the local analyst dummy,
log of firm size, analyst experience, number of analysts covering the firm, and number of firms covered per analyst. In the
equation (4) regressions, the number of analysts working for the brokerage is also included as an additional independent
variable. The recommendation variable takes the following values: 3 = buy, 2 = hold, and 1 = sell. Firms are split into
groups based on inclusion/non-inclusion in the MSCI World Free Index as of December 2003. Firm observations are also
split into equal groups based on firm size and on the firm book-to-market ratio. Brokerages are split into small and large
brokerages based on the number of analysts employed, such that the number of small and large local brokerages are the
same, and the number of small and large foreign brokerages are the same. Foreign brokerages are also split into groups
based on local presence and whether they are based in the U.S. The t-statistics derived using White (1980) standard
errors are in parentheses. ˆ = significant at the 10% level, * = significant at the 5% level, ** = significant at the 1% level.
Panel A. Grouped by Firm Type
Firm Type
MSCI Non-
Coefficient on local analyst dummy in: Index Index Large Small Growth Value
Equation (3) regression 0.120** 0.116** 0.133** 0.102** 0.101** 0.130**
(13.86) (13.03) (15.40) (11.37) (11.35) (13.88)
Equation (4) regression 0.117** 0.095** 0.123** 0.093** 0.080** 0.131**
(11.27) (8.91) (11.80) (8.65) (7.44) (11.65)
Panel B. Grouped by Brokerage Type
All Brokerage Types Foreign Brokerage Type
Local No
Coefficient on local analyst dummy in: Large Small Presence Presence U.S. Non-U.S.
Equation (3) regression 0.111** 0.148** 0.107** 0.129** 0.080** 0.124**
(12.25) (16.36) (15.30) (17.71) (9.07) (18.98)
Equation (4) regression 0.172** 0.097** 0.095** 0.120** 0.050** 0.107**
(10.98) (8.93) (10.62) (12.35) (2.78) (13.77)
announcement day as well as one week, one month, and two months following
the announcement to gauge the information content of the recommendation.
If the pattern of cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) is consistent with the
optimism results in the previous section, then local analyst buys should under-
perform foreign analyst buys while local analyst sells should outperform foreign
analyst sells. The underlying intuition is that local analysts are more eager to issue
buy calls on local stocks. As a result, foreign buy calls contain more positive in-
formation. Conversely, local analysts are more reluctant to issue sell calls on local
stocks. As a result, local sell calls contain more negative information. If, however,
the pattern of CARs is consistent with local analysts having an informational ad-
vantage over foreign analysts through geographical proximity (Hau (2001), Mal-
loy (2005), and Choe, Kho, and Stulz, (2005)), then the local buys/sells should
outperform foreign buys/sells. Conversely, if foreign analysts, who might have
greater expertise and access to better resources, possess informational advantages
over local analysts (Seasholes (2006), Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000)), then lo-
cal buys/sells should underperform foreign buys/sells. An analysis of the pattern
in CARs thus allows us to discriminate between the relative optimism and the
informational advantage stories.
The pattern of CARs reported in Table 6 is broadly consistent with local ana-
lysts being more optimistic than foreign analysts. Buys and holds issued by local
analysts underperform buys and holds issued by foreign analysts for all horizons.
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Conversely, sells issued by local analysts outperform sells issued by foreign ana-
lysts for all horizons tested. Similar results are obtained with upgrades to buy and
downgrades to sell. Moreover, differences in the CAR following local and foreign
analyst recommendations are almost always statistically significant. For example,
during the announcement day, local buys underperform foreign buys by 24 basis
points, while local sells outperform foreign sells by −22 basis points. Both dif-
ferences are statistically significant at the 1% level. Moreover, the announcement
day return spread between a foreign analyst buy and a local analyst sell is an eco-
nomically significant 1.09%, outperforming the spread between foreign buys and
sells and the spread between local buys and sells. In fact, the same result holds
over all horizons and with upgrades/downgrades as well. To sidestep coverage
issues, we also redo the CAR analysis on the sample of matched firms and obtain
similar results.
It is intriguing to note that contrary to studies on analyst recommendations
in the U.S. that show that buy recommendations on U.S. stocks have less informa-
tional content than sell recommendations (see Womack (1996), Barber, Lehavy,
McNichols, and Trueman (2001)), the absolute CARs following a foreign analyst
buy or upgrade are greater than those following a foreign analyst sell or down-
grade for emerging market stocks (see the point estimates in columns five to eight
of Table 6). This sharply contrasts with the informational content of U.S. stock
recommendations. One reason for the dissonance may be that the investment
banking-induced incentive to bias recommendations on U.S. stocks does not ap-
ply as strongly to emerging market stocks, at least for foreign analysts.
Given that cross-sectional dependence issues may bias test statistics for the
abnormal performance measures calculated above (see Mitchell and Stafford
(2000)), we also examine the performance of calendar-based portfolios. The cal-
endar time portfolio approach has its own drawbacks that motivate using both
approaches. According to Loughran and Ritter (2000), the calendar time port-
folio approach has lower power to detect abnormal performance when it exists
mostly in periods of high event activity. Our calendar time portfolio approach
follows that of Barber, Lehavy, and Trueman (2007). We form five portfolios for
each group of analysts (local and foreign): a buy portfolio, a hold portfolio, a sell
portfolio, an upgrade to buy portfolio, and a downgrade to sell portfolio.
To understand how these portfolios are constructed, take the buy portfolio
as an example. For each local analyst in the database, we identify initiations and
reiterations of buy recommendations. For each of these recommendations, the
recommended stock enters the buy portfolio at the close of the trading day of the
announcement. Each recommended stock remains in the portfolio until the stock
is downgraded or dropped from coverage by the analyst (we assume this occurs
when recommendations have not been updated after 240 days). If more than one
analyst recommends a particular stock on a given date, then that stock appears
multiple times in the portfolio on that date, one for each buy recommendation
(see Barber, Lehavy, and Trueman (2007) for more details on the construction of
the calendar time portfolios).
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Next, we estimate performance relative to the CAPM, the Fama and French
(1993) three-factor model, and the Carhart (1997) four-factor model:
rit = αi + βiRMRFi + eit,(5)
rit = αi + βiRMRFi + siSMBi + hiHMLi + eit,(6)
and
rit = αi + βiRMRFi + siSMBi + hiHMLi + piPR1YRi + eit,(7)
where t = 1, . . . ,T, rit is the daily return on calendar time portfolio i in excess
of the risk-free rate, RMRF is the excess return on a value-weighted aggregate
market proxy, and SMB, HML, and PR1YR are returns on a value-weighted, zero
investment, factor-mimicking portfolio for size, book-to-market equity, and a one-
year momentum in stock returns. The four-factor model adds to the three-factor
model a momentum factor, PR1YR, that captures the Jegadeesh and Titman (1993)
one-year momentum anomaly. The Fama and French (1993) factors are calculated
in the same way as in Fama and French (1998). For example, to form the SMB
factor, we rank all sample firms in each country in descending order by their
market capitalization at the end of each year. Then, we form a large-cap portfolio
with the top 30% of stocks and a small-cap portfolio with the bottom 30% of
stocks. Then, we calculate the value-weighted daily returns of each portfolio.
The country SMB portfolio is the difference between the return on the small-cap
portfolio and the return on the large-cap portfolio. The SMB factor we use is a
value-weighted country SMB factor in which the weights are based on the stock
market capitalizations of the eight countries in the sample.
The abnormal returns of the calendar time portfolios reported in Table 7
broadly corroborate the results from the CAR analysis. However, while local
analyst buys/holds still underperform foreign analyst buys/holds, the difference
in performance is no longer statistically significant at the 10% level. Nonethe-
less, local analyst sells continue to reliably outperform foreign analyst sells by
−3.4 basis points per day or −8.16% per year (t-statistic = 1.96) after adjusting
for return covariation with the Fama and French (1993) factors. Sharper results
emerge from the analysis of analyst recommendation changes. After adjusting
for return covariation with the Fama and French factors, local analyst upgrades
underperform foreign analyst upgrades by 3 basis points per day or 7.2% annual-
ized, while local analyst downgrades outperform foreign analyst downgrades by
−5.9 basis points per day or −14.2% annualized. Both spreads are statistically
significant at the 1% level.
The weaker results for buy recommendations are consistent with the distri-
bution of recommendation levels reported in Table 2, where the difference in pro-
portion is more striking for sells than for buys. The stronger results for the recom-
mendation changes with the calendar time approach are also consistent with the
results from other U.S. studies that show recommendation changes contain more
information than recommendation levels. It is also comforting to note from Panel
F of Table 7 that the strategy that buys foreign upgrades and short sells local down-
grades outperforms strategies based solely on local recommendation changes or
solely on foreign recommendation changes. These results neatly complement the
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upgrade/downgrade spread results in Panel B of Table 6. Overall, the calendar
time portfolio analysis provides additional evidence on the underperformance of
local analyst upgrades and the overperformanceof local analyst sells/downgrades.
It also echoes the results of Barber, Lehavy, and Trueman (2007) who analyze the
recommendation performance of two groups of analysts facing different invest-
ment banking pressure: analysts from U.S. investment banks and analysts work-
ing at independent U.S. research firms.
C. Trade Reaction to Analyst Recommendations
According to The Wall Street Journal, July 14, 1992, Morgan Stanley asserts
that customers of its equity research reports are too sophisticated to accept re-
search influenced by investment banking pressure. In this section, we test whether
sophisticated foreign investors, local institutions, and local retail investors recog-
nize the full extent of the bias among local analysts. As Michaely and Womack
((2005) p. 410) put it, “if investors are aware of this marketing bias and discount
it appropriately, then, to some extent, no harm is done.”
To see whether “no harm is done,” we analyze the trade reactions of investors
grouped by investor type on the Korea Stock Exchange to local and foreign an-
alyst recommendations and upgrades/downgrades. The Korea Stock Exchange
provides access to daily net buys grouped by investor types for all stocks traded
on the exchange. Our analysis focuses on the standardized trade imbalance (our
proxy for buying pressure) by investor type on day 0 to day 1 of the recommen-
dation where day 0 is the day of the recommendation announcement. The stan-
dardized trade imbalance15 for firm i, investor type x, and date t is
TIstdi,x,t =
TIi,x,t − TIi,x,year(t)
stddev(TIi,x,year(t))
,(8)
where
TIi,x,t =
buy volumei,x,t − sell volumei,x,t
buy volumei,x,t + sell volumei,x,t
.(9)
The variables TIi,x,year(t) and stddev(TIi,x,year(t)) are the mean and standard devia-
tion of TI or trade imbalance for firm i, investor type x, over year t, respectively.
Our use of the standardized trade imbalance follows Malmendier and Shan-
thikumar (2006) and adjusts for firm and year fixed effects as well as systematic
volatility differences in large and small stocks. This facilitates comparison of
trade imbalance across time, firms, and investor types. To gauge the trade reaction
to recommendations, we estimate two sets of regressions for each investor type.
First, we regress standardized trade imbalance on buy, hold, and sell dummies.
Second, we regress the standardized trade imbalance on upgrade and downgrade
dummies.
15The standardized trade imbalances are based on the number of shares bought and sold. We also
redo the analysis using standardized trade imbalance based on the value of shares bought and sold. Our
results are almost identical with this alternate calculation of standardized trade imbalance. The results
are also virtually identical when we use abnormal trade imbalance or TIi,x,t − TIi,x,year(t) instead of
standardized trade imbalance.
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The results from the analysis of the standardized trade imbalance, reported in
Table 8, are striking. First, in response to buy recommendations and upgrades, so-
phisticated foreign investors and local institutions buy while local retail investors
sell. Conversely, in response to analyst sell recommendations and downgrades,
foreign investors and local institutions sell while local retail investors buy. These
effects are statistically different from zero for the average recommendation for
retail investors and local institutions, and may help explain the overperformance
of institutions and underperformance of retail investors in emerging markets (see,
for instance, Barber, Lee, Liu, and Odean (2006)).
Second, local institutions react more to local analyst reports while foreign
investors react more to foreign analyst reports. The standardized trade imbalances
of local institutions in response to local analyst buys, holds, sells, and downgrades
are larger in magnitude than their standardized trade imbalances in response to
foreign analyst buys, holds, sells, and downgrades, respectively. On the other
hand, the standardized trade imbalances of foreign investors in response to local
analyst recommendations are smaller in magnitude than their trade imbalances
in response to foreign analyst recommendations. This is not surprising given
that local analyst recommendations are more accessible to local institutions while
foreign analyst recommendations are more accessible to foreign institutions.
Third, despite the optimistic nature of local analyst recommendations, local
institutions buy more after a local buy recommendation than they sell after a local
sell recommendation. While they do react in the correct fashion to local holds,
their marked response to local buys (standardized trade imbalance = 0.065) rela-
tive to local sells (standardized trade imbalance = −0.044) indicates that they do
not fully internalize the bias in local analyst recommendations.
Fourth, foreign investors appear to trade on the belief that foreign analyst
recommendations are positively biased. Despite the fact that foreign analyst buys
and upgrades possess greater informational content (insofar as reflected in the
CAR results of Table 616) than do foreign analyst sells and downgrades, respec-
tively, foreign investors react more to foreign sells and downgrades than to for-
eign buys and upgrades. Following a foreign analyst sell call, foreign investors
react with a standardized trade imbalance of−0.127, which is more than twice as
large in absolute terms as that following foreign analyst buy calls (standardized
trade imbalance = 0.057). One view is that the belief, formed over U.S. stock
recommendations, that sells are more informative than buys (Womack (1996)) is
so ingrained among foreign investors that it influences their trades in emerging
market stocks as well.
Fifth, neither the sophisticated foreign investors nor the local institutions ap-
pear fully aware of the optimism differences between foreign and local analysts.
Despite the evidence showing that local sells convey more negative information
16We believe that the CAR results are more relevant for the trade reaction analysis over day 0 to 1.
This is because the CAR analysis better captures the short-term returns following analyst announce-
ments than does the calendar time portfolio analysis. The CAR results in Table 6 are based on the
full sample of countries. We also estimate the CARs for the sample of stocks on the Korean Stock
Exchange. While the statistical significance of the results falls naturally with the reduced sample size,
the pattern of CARs for the stocks in the Korean Stock Exchange is very similar to that for the full
sample of countries.
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TABLE 7
Calendar Time Portfolio Analysis of Local and Foreign Analyst Recommendations
Table 7 reports the average daily percentage buy and hold return/market-adjusted return/abnormal return for portfolios of
buy, hold, and sell recommendations, as well as upgrades to buy and downgrades to sell. To obtain the CAPM abnormal
return, portfolio excess return is regressed on a constant and RMRF . To obtain the Fama-French abnormal return, portfolio
excess return is regressed on a constant, RMRF, SMB, and HML. To obtain the four-factor abnormal return, portfolio
excess return is regressed on a constant, RMRF, SMB, HML, and PR1YR. RMRF is the excess return on a value-weighted
aggregate market proxy, and SMB, HML, and PR1YR are returns on value-weighted, zero investment, factor-mimicking
portfolios for size, book-to-market equity, and one-year momentum in stock returns. The sample period is from January
1994 to December 2003. ˆ = significant at the 10% level, * = significant at the 5% level, and ** = significant at the 1%
level.
Abnormal Return
Raw Fama- Four-Factor
Return CAPM French Model
Panel A. Buy Recommendations
Local 0.044* 0.020 0.017 0.018
(1.98) (0.91) (0.80) (0.81)
Foreign 0.048* 0.025 0.023 0.023
(2.52) (1.32) (1.23) (1.22)
Foreign− Local 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.005
(0.51) (0.54) (0.64) (0.58)
Panel B. Hold Recommendations
Local 0.004 −0.019 −0.023 −0.021
(0.16) (−0.74) (−0.86) (−0.81)
Foreign 0.013 −0.011 −0.013 −0.012
(0.64) (−0.54) (−0.69) (−0.63)
Foreign− Local 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009
(0.55) (0.57) (0.59) (0.58)
Panel C. Sell Recommendations
Local −0.039 −0.062* −0.066* −0.064*
(−1.45) (−2.36) (−2.52) (−2.44)
Foreign −0.005 −0.028 −0.032 −0.030
(−0.22) (−1.26) (−1.44) (−1.35)
Foreign− Local 0.034ˆ 0.034ˆ 0.034* 0.034ˆ
(1.94) (1.94) (1.96) (1.93)
Panel D. Upgrade to Buy
Local 0.052* 0.028 0.026 0.026
(2.22) (1.23) (1.11) (1.11)
Foreign 0.081** 0.058** 0.056** 0.056**
(4.09) (2.97) (2.88) (2.86)
Foreign− Local 0.029* 0.030* 0.030** 0.030**
(2.54) (2.57) (2.63) (2.60)
Panel E. Downgrade to Sell
Local −0.081** −0.105** −0.108** −0.106**
(−3.15) (−4.11) (−4.27) (−4.17)
Foreign −0.028 −0.051* −0.055* −0.053*
(−1.22) (−2.27) (−2.46) (−2.36)
Foreign− Local 0.059** 0.060** 0.059** 0.059**
(3.75) (3.76) (3.76) (3.72)
Panel F. Long Upgrade to Buy, Short Downgrade to Sell
Long local upgrade, short local downgrade 0.137** 0.137** 0.137** 0.136**
(11.38) (11.38) (11.42) (11.28)
Long foreign upgrade, short foreign downgrade 0.109** 0.109** 0.110** 0.109**
(11.91) (11.86) (12.18) (11.93)
Long foreign upgrade, short local downgrade 0.165** 0.165** 0.166** 0.164**
(10.31) (10.31) (10.39) (10.24)
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TABLE 8
Trade Reaction to Analyst Recommendations by Investor Type
Table 8 reports the trade reaction for Korean stocks (Korean Stock Exchange) grouped by investor type and analyst
recommendation type from day 0 to day 1 inclusive, where day 0 denotes the day of the recommendation. Investor types
include foreign investors, local institutions, and local retail investors. Panel A reports the coefficient estimates on the
buy, hold, and sell dummies when standardized trade imbalance is regressed on the buy, hold, and sell dummies. The
regressions are estimated separately for each investor type. Panel B reports the coefficient estimates on the upgrade
and downgrade dummies when standardized trade imbalance is regressed on the upgrade and downgrade dummies.
Upgrades denote upgrades to buy. Downgrades denote downgrades to sell. As in Panel A, the regressions are estimated
separately for each investor type. Trade imbalance is net buys divided by total buys and sells. Standardized trade
imbalance is trade imbalance minus mean trade imbalance divided by standard deviation of trade imbalance, where the
mean and standard deviation are calculated over the year for each firm and investor type. The t-statistics derived using
White (1980) standard errors are in parentheses. ˆ = significant at the 10% level, * = significant at the 5% level, and ** =
significant at the 1% level.
Panel A. Coefficient Estimates on Buy/Hold/Sell Dummies in Regression on Standardized Trade Imbalance
All Analysts Local Analysts Foreign Analysts
Investor Type: Buy Hold Sell Buy Hold Sell Buy Hold Sell
Foreign investors 0.028* −0.007 −0.028 0.006 0.010 0.046* 0.057** −0.042 −0.127**
(2.01) (−0.45) (−1.52) (0.34) (0.56) (2.08) (2.75) (−1.59) (−3.93)
Local institutions 0.051** −0.050** −0.043ˆ 0.065** −0.062** −0.044 0.033 −0.026 −0.043
(3.30) (−3.03) (−1.87) (3.05) (−3.02) (−1.45) (1.46) (−0.92) (−1.18)
Local retail investors −0.048** 0.034ˆ 0.087** −0.024 0.016 0.061ˆ −0.081** 0.071* 0.122**
(−2.95) (1.88) (3.28) (−1.08) (0.75) (1.71) (−3.39) (2.32) (3.06)
Panel B. Coefficient Estimates on Upgrade/Downgrade Dummies in Regression on Standardized Trade Imbalance
All Analysts Local Analysts Foreign Analysts
Investor Type: Upgrade Downgrade Upgrade Downgrade Upgrade Downgrade
Foreign investors 0.042ˆ −0.070* 0.009 0.041 0.094** −0.165**
(1.91) (−2.40) (0.34) (1.00) (2.61) (−4.03)
Local institutions 0.079** −0.074* 0.074* −0.092ˆ 0.088* −0.058
(3.25) (−2.11) (2.33) (−1.77) (2.30) (−1.23)
Local retail investors −0.058* 0.147** −0.009 0.119* −0.135** 0.172**
(−2.29) (3.78) (−0.29) (2.01) (−3.42) (3.31)
than foreign sells, foreign investors buy following local sells. While local institu-
tions trade in the right direction in response to sells and buys from both local and
foreign analysts, the ratio of their standardized trade imbalance following buys to
their standardized trade imbalance following sells for local analysts (= −1.48) is
higher in absolute terms relative to the corresponding ratio for foreign analysts (=
−0.77). This indicates that local institutions trade as if the information in local
analyst buys relative to sells is higher than that in foreign analyst buys relative to
sells.17
The trade reaction graphs in Figure 1 map out the standardized trade im-
balance by investor type, two days before to five days after recommendation an-
nouncements from local and foreign analysts. They depict a rich and intuitive
pattern in investor behavior. In addition to corroborating the results from Table 8,
the trade reaction graphs suggest that foreign investors may get a sneak peak at
the analyst reports (local and foreign) before they are announced.18 Neither local
17One caveat is that in response to upgrades and downgrades, domestic institutions correctly trade
as if local upgrades contain less information than local downgrades and as if foreign upgrades contain
more information than foreign downgrades.
18The standardized trade imbalances of foreign investors are statistically different from zero two
days prior to the announcements but statistically positive one day prior to the announcements. Specif-
ically, the t-statistic that tests whether the standardized trade imbalance for foreign investors one day
prior to an announcement is equal to zero is 2.46 for all analyst buys, 1.76 for local analyst buys, and
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institutions nor local retail investors demonstrate a similar uncanny ability to pre-
dict analyst announcements. This finding echoes the results of Irvine, Lipson, and
Puckett (2006) who show that U.S. institutions receive and act on tips on analyst
recommendations up to five days in advance of the announcement date. In addi-
tion, the pattern in the standardized trade imbalance of retail investors suggests
that they tend to react with a lag of two or three days to local analyst recommen-
dation announcements. This is consistent with the view that while institutions
(local and foreign) get timely access to analyst reports in exchange for broker-
age business, retail investors must contend with less preferential access to analyst
research.
FIGURE 1
Trade Reaction to Local and Foreign Analysts’ Recommendations Grouped by Investor Type
Figure 1 shows the standardized trade imbalance of various investor types in relation to local and foreign analyst recom-
mendations. The sample period is from 1995 to 2003. Analysts are classified as local or foreign according to the location
of the head office of their brokerage relative to the stock covered. Standardized trade imbalance is the ratio of buys minus
sells divided by total buys and sells after adjusting for firm and year fixed effects and the volatility differences across firms.
Day 0 corresponds to the day of the recommendation announcement.
-2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
-200
-100
0
100
200
Trade Reaction to Local Analyst Buys
Day
S
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
i
z
e
d
 
T
r
a
d
e
 
I
m
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
-2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
-200
-100
0
100
200
Trade Reaction to Foreign Analyst Buys
Day
S
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
i
z
e
d
 
T
r
a
d
e
 
I
m
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
domestic institutions
domestic retail
foreign investors
-2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
-100
-50
0
50
100
150
Trade Reaction to Local Analyst Sells
Day
S
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
i
z
e
d
 
T
r
a
d
e
 
I
m
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
-2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
-100
-50
0
50
100
150
Trade Reaction to Foreign Analyst Sells
Day
S
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
i
z
e
d
 
T
r
a
d
e
 
I
m
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
Our trade reaction results also relate to those of Malmendier and Shanthiku-
mar (2006) who analyze the reaction of small and large trades around analyst rec-
ommendations. Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2006) find that large traders are
better able to recognize the bias in analyst recommendations than small traders.
Their results are consistent with our trade reaction results to the extent that the
local institutions (i.e., the large traders) exert selling pressure following holds by
local analysts while the local retail investors (i.e., the small traders) exert pressure
that is statistically indistinguishable from zero following holds by local analysts.
The local institutions appear to be aware of the tendency of local analysts to is-
sue holds when sells are warranted, whereas the local retail investors appear to be
unaware of this bias.
In summary, the results in this section indicate that while sophisticated for-
eign investors and local institutions in emerging markets actively follow analyst
1.73 for foreign analyst buys. This is also consistent, however, with foreign investors trading on the
same information as that in analyst buy reports on the day before the announcement.
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recommendations, they do not fully internalize the relative optimism of local an-
alysts. They trade, incorrectly, as if foreign analysts are more optimistic than
local analysts. It seems that these investors overestimate the pressures facing for-
eign analysts and underestimate the pressures facing local analysts.19 Hence, the
ability of sophisticated investors to unravel and correctly assess the investment
banking pressures of sell-side analysts, purported by Morgan Stanley, appears
suspect.
IV. Discussion
Many factors may drive the higher levels of optimism among local analysts.
Local analysts may face greater pressures to generate brokerage commissions than
do foreign analysts. Reputable foreign analysts may seek to protect their stellar
reputations by not making biased calls. Foreign analysts may cover firms with
greater institutional presence. Because analysts depend on institutions for per-
formance ratings and brokerage commissions, pressures by institutional investors
may induce foreign analysts to generate more objective reports (Ljungqvist et al.
(2007)). Foreign analysts may shade their recommendations in light of the cur-
rency and country risks inherent in emerging country stocks. Local analysts may
suffer from familiarity bias. Alternatively, local analysts may be biased because
they have prior underwriting relations with local firms. The selection hypothe-
sis (McNichols and O’Brien (1997)) suggests that this bias may stem from IPO
firms choosing underwriters with analysts who are predisposed to the firm. Alter-
natively, the cognitive bias hypothesis (Kahneman and Lovallo (1993)) contends
that affiliated analysts are biased because they truly believe that the firms they
underwrite are superior to the firms underwritten by their competitors. Finally,
local analysts may face greater investment banking pressure20 than do foreign an-
alysts. This section carefully explores the possibility that these factors motivate
the difference in recommendation optimism between local and foreign analysts.
A. Brokerage Commissions
If local analysts truly face greater pressures to generate brokerage commis-
sions than do foreign analysts, it may explain why local analysts issue more buy
recommendations. However, the difference in the number of buy recommenda-
tions issued is small (see Table 2). Moreover, if the pressure to generate commis-
sions motivates the bias difference between local and foreign analysts, then the
bias difference should be exacerbated when we limit ourselves to large stocks. By
definition, institutions hold more, in dollar terms, large stocks than small stocks.
Pressures to generate commissions should be less acute with small stocks.21 How-
ever, we find that the coefficient on the local analyst dummy for small stocks (see
19To reconcile these results with those of Table 6, there must be informed traders at the margin who
correctly estimate the pressures facing local and foreign analysts.
20Clearly, investment banking pressure can exist net of underwriter affiliation effects. Intuitively,
the need to generate future investment banking business, and not just the need to reward past invest-
ment banking business, should motivate optimism among sell-side analysts.
21This argument implicitly assumes that analysts cater more to institutions than to retail investors.
Our trade reaction results in Table 8 indicate that this is a reasonable assumption. Unlike institutional
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column four in Panel A of Table 5) is still comparable to that for the full sample
and is highly statistically significant. Hence, it is unlikely that the pressure to
generate brokerage commissions lies at the root of our results.
B. Analyst Reputation Concerns
If foreign analysts are more reputable than local analysts, then foreign an-
alysts may be more inclined to issue objective recommendations to protect their
reputations. Table 1 indicates that foreign analysts belong to larger brokerages
employing more analysts. Relative to local analysts, these foreign analysts are
likely to be better paid and have better reputations. However, if the reputation
concerns story holds, then reputable analysts should be more objective than other
analysts. To test this directly, we augment the equation (3) and equation (4) re-
gressions of Table 3 with a dummy that equals one if an analyst belongs to an
Institutional Investor magazine All-Asia team22 in the previous election year, and
equals zero otherwise. We find that analysts from All-Asia teams are more opti-
mistic than other analysts. These results are statistically significant at the 1% level
(t-statistic = 2.63 in the augmented equation (4) regression), and run counter to the
view that the higher reputation results in lower recommendation optimism among
analysts. In fact, when we breakdown the All-Asia team dummy into a dummy
for the first-place All-Asia team, a dummy for the second-place All-Asia team,
etc., we find that analysts in the first-place All-Asia team are significantly more
optimistic than other analysts (t-statistic = 5.49 in the augmented equation (4) re-
gression). Moreover, the coefficient estimates fall as we move from the first-place
to the fourth-place team dummy (All-Asia analysts are placed into four teams)
strongly suggesting that having a better reputation does not necessarily result in
lower optimism among analysts.
C. Institutional Presence
Greater institutional presence among stocks recommended by foreign ana-
lysts may also account for the lower levels of optimism among foreign analysts
(Ljungqvist et al. (2007)). This view necessarily implies that the difference in bias
falls when we constrain the sample to MSCI index stocks, which are widely held
by institutions and where variation in institutional presence is less than across the
full sample of firms. By reestimating the regressions in equations (3) and (4) on
the sample of MSCI firms, we find that the difference in optimism levels between
local and foreign analysts is actually larger relative to that for the full sample of
firms. The coefficients on the local analyst dummy for the MSCI sample of firms
are 0.120 (t-statistic = 13.86) and 0.117 (t-statistic = 11.27) for the regressions
in equations (3) and (4), respectively (see Table 5). Those for the full sample
are 0.116 and 0.104, respectively (see Table 3). The strength of the local analyst
investors, retail investors seem to react with a significant lag to analyst recommendation announce-
ments.
22To select members for the All-Asia teams (which are analogous to the All-America teams), In-
stitutional Investor sends a questionnaire to directors of research and heads of investment at approxi-
mately 400 institutions and investment firms that are major investors in the Asia ex-Japan region. The
rankings are published in May every year.
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dummy coefficients in the MSCI index stock sample indicates that institutional
presence does not account for the difference in optimism levels between local and
foreign analysts.
D. Country and Currency Risk
Institutional presence aside, foreign analysts, who cater primarily to sophis-
ticated foreign institutions, may shade their recommendations of emerging market
stocks in light of the country and currency risks inherent in emerging markets. To
test this hypothesis, we augment the equation (4) regression in Table 3 with three
independent variables: currency risk, country risk, and the interaction of country
risk with the local analyst dummy. For a recommendation issued by an analyst
headquartered in country x and on a stock in country y, we take as currency risk
the standard deviation of daily returns of currency y relative to base currency x
over the past year. By definition, the currency risk for local analyst recommen-
dations is zero since x equals y in those cases. We use the Euromoney’s annual
estimate of country risk as our country risk variable.23
Not surprisingly, we find that the coefficients on currency risk and country
risk are both negative and statistically different from zero, reflecting the damp-
ening effect that risk has on recommendation optimism levels. However, the in-
teraction variable between the country risk and the local analyst dummy variable
is mildly negative (but statistically indistinguishable from zero) as well. It ap-
pears that country risk affects local analyst recommendations more than it affects
foreign analyst recommendations. Consequently, the coefficient estimate on the
local analyst dummy is virtually identical (coefficient estimate = 0.103) with the
augmented equation (4) regression and remains statistically different from zero
at the 1% level (t-statistic = 8.20). One possible reason for this is that local ana-
lysts, unlike foreign analysts, are affected by prevailing local sentiment, which is
negatively correlated with country risk.
E. Familiarity Bias
Moreover, the optimism of local analysts may be driven by familiarity bias,
which has been linked to the traditional home bias literature (see, for example,
Bailey, Kumar, and Ng (2006)). The familiarity bias story suggests that local
analysts may develop a stronger preference for local stocks because they are more
in tune with local companies than are foreign analysts. This view also implies that
the local analyst optimism should fall once we control for the number of stocks
covered. Further, any familiarity bias-induced optimism differences should be
attenuated when we compare local analysts to foreign analysts who reside locally.
However, in Table 3, we find that controlling for the number of firms an analyst
covers barely affects the coefficient estimate on the local analyst dummy. Also,
in Panel B of Table 5 we find that foreign analysts whose brokerages have a local
presence (and, hence, are more likely to reside locally) are only somewhat less
23Euromoney gives a higher score (ranging from 0 to 100) to a less risky country. We transform
the score and use (100-original Euromoney score)/10 so that the score is positively correlated with the
level of risk.
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pessimistic (relative to local analysts) than foreign analysts whose brokerages do
not have a local presence.
F. Selection and Cognitive Biases
Another explanation for the greater optimism of local analysts could be that
there are more local than foreign affiliated analysts and that affiliated analysts
suffer from selection or cognitive biases. That is, either firms select underwriters
based in part on how favorable the underwriter’s analysts are about the firm (Mc-
Nichols and O’Brien (1997)), or analysts believe that any firm underwritten by
their brokerage must be superior to firms underwritten by competing brokerages
(Kahneman and Lovallo (1993)). If this holds true, then the optimism differences
between local and foreign analysts should disappear once we control for analyst
affiliation status. To this end, we reestimate the equation (3) and equation (4) re-
gressions augmented with a dummy for past underwriter affiliation and a dummy
for future underwriter affiliation. Our analysis includes only firms for which we
have underwriter information from 1990 to 2004. As a result, the number of firm
recommendation observations falls by about 47% relative to that in Table 3. We
consider several variants of the affiliation dummies including one-, two-, five-
year, and infinite year affiliation dummies. The one-year past affiliation dummy
takes a value of one if the analyst belongs to the lead or co-lead underwriter for
the firm’s IPO or SEO not more than a year ago. It takes a value of zero otherwise.
The other past affiliation dummies and the future affiliation dummies are defined
analogously.
The pattern in past and future affiliation dummy coefficients reported in Ta-
ble 9 is intriguing. Over all horizons, the coefficient for the past affiliation dummy
is positive. With the infinite look-back period, the past affiliation dummy is statis-
tically different from zero at the 5% level for both the equation (3) and equation
(4) regressions. At the same time, the future affiliation dummy is statistically
positive over all of the look-ahead horizons. With the infinite look-ahead horizon,
the coefficient estimate on the future affiliation dummy is about one and a half
times that of the corresponding past affiliation dummy. Nonetheless, despite the
explanatory power of the affiliation dummies and the 47% reduction in sample
size, the local analyst dummy coefficient is still statistically positive at the 1%
level for all regression specifications. A comparison of the coefficients on the lo-
cal analyst dummy for the most comprehensive regression specification (equation
(4)) in Table 3 and in Table 9 reveals that the infinite horizon past and future affil-
iation effects only account for less than 5% of the optimism differences between
local and foreign analysts. Clearly, one cannot explain the bulk of the optimism
differences with underwriting-induced selection and cognitive bias.
G. Investment Banking Pressures
The evidence presented thus far suggests that the difference in recommenda-
tion optimism between local and foreign analysts is not mainly driven by broker-
age commissions, reputation concerns, institutional presence, country and cur-
rency risk, familiarity bias, and underwriting-induced selection and cognitive
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TABLE 9
Regressions on Analyst Recommendation Optimism Controlling for Underwriter Affiliation
Pooled OLS regressions are estimated from January 1994 to December 2003 across all analyst recommendation/firm
observations in the sample at that time. The dependent variable is the analyst recommendation minus this month’s median
recommendation. In the augmented equation (3) regressions, the independent variables are the local analyst dummy, the
past affiliation dummy, the future affiliation dummy, the log of firm size, the number of firms covered by the analyst, the
number of analysts covering the firm, the experience level in years of the analyst, and the full set of country and year
dummies. In the augmented equation (4) regressions, the number of analysts employed by the brokerage is also included
among the regressors. Observations with consensus generated with less than three observations are excluded from the
analysis. Firms without IPO/SEO lead underwriter information are also excluded from the analysis. The analysis includes
both domestic and international issues. The recommendation variable takes the following values: 3 = buy, 2 = hold, and
1 = sell. The past affiliation dummy (≤ 1 year post-IPO/SEO) takes a value of 1 if the analyst belongs to a brokerage that
was the lead or joint lead manager for the firm’s IPO or SEO not more than a year ago. It takes a value of 0 otherwise. The
other affiliation dummies are defined analogously. The future affiliation dummy (≤ 1 year pre-IPO/SEO) takes a value of 1
if the analyst belongs to a brokerage that will be the lead or joint lead manager for the firm’s IPO or SEO not more than a
year in the future. It takes a value of 0 otherwise. The other future affiliation dummies are defined analogously. Only the
coefficients on the local analyst dummy and the affiliation dummies are reported for brevity. The number of observations for
each regression is 64,537. The t-statistics derived using White (1980) standard errors are in parentheses. ˆ = significant
at the 10% level, * = significant at the 5% level, and ** = significant at the 1% level.
Augmented with Affiliation Dummies
Independent Variable Eq. (3) Eq. (4) Eq. (3) Eq. (4) Eq. (3) Eq. (4) Eq. (3) Eq. (4)
Local analyst dummy 0.117** 0.108** 0.118** 0.109** 0.117** 0.106** 0.115** 0.105**
(14.07) (10.82) (14.11) (10.84) (13.95) (10.59) (13.79) (10.39)
Past affiliation dummy 0.057ˆ 0.060ˆ
(≤ 1-year post-IPO/SEO) (1.65) (1.72)
Past affiliation dummy 0.008 0.010
(≤ 2-years post-IPO/SEO) (0.31) (0.40)
Past affiliation dummy 0.036ˆ 0.039*
(≤ 5-years post-IPO/SEO) (1.91) (2.04)
Past affiliation dummy 0.050** 0.053**
(≤ ∞ years post-IPO/SEO) (3.05) (3.21)
Future affiliation dummy 0.120** 0.123**
(≤ 1-year pre-IPO/SEO) (2.80) (2.86)
Future affiliation dummy 0.102** 0.105**
(≤ 2-years pre-IPO/SEO) (3.11) (3.19)
Future affiliation dummy 0.088** 0.091**
(≤ 5-years pre-IPO/SEO) (3.41) (3.53)
Future affiliation dummy 0.075** 0.078**
(≤ ∞ years pre-IPO/SEO) (3.14) (3.27)
bias. It remains to test the link between investment banking pressures (sans un-
derwriter affiliation effects) and local analyst recommendation optimism.
In this effort, we estimate the equation (4) regressions augmented with two
investment banking proxies: the number of equity issues within the firm’s country
and the proportion of equity issues underwritten by brokerages in the analyst’s
brokerage country.24 We hypothesize that when issue volume is higher and hence
market-wide investment banking pressures are stronger, local analysts are even
more optimistic, relative to their foreign counterparts, than when issue volume is
low. Hence, the first proxy enters as an interaction variable in the regression. The
second proxy enters directly into the regression as it captures investment banking
pressures specific to the analyst’s brokerage country. We also include past and
future affiliation dummies (with an infinite look-back/-ahead period) among the
24The proportion of equity issues is based on the ratio of the number of equity issues underwrit-
ten by brokerages in the analyst’s country to the total number of equity issues. In results available
from the authors, we perform the analogous, augmented equation (3) regressions, and use investment
banking proxies based on the value of equity issues. We obtain qualitatively similar results with these
alternative specifications.
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regressors to abstract from any affiliation effects. We consider investment banking
proxies lagged one year, in the current year, and one year ahead to accommodate
any lead/lag effects.
The coefficient estimates reported in Table 10 reveal a strong link between
the investment banking proxies and differences between local and foreign analyst
recommendation optimism. Relative to the baseline regression results in the far
right column of Table 9, the results in the far right column of Table 10 indicate that
variation in the investment banking proxies explains up to 87% of the coefficient
estimate on the local analyst dummy. Indeed, relative recommendation optimism
among local analysts appears to be correlated with the number and proportion
(by brokerage country) of issues underwritten in the next year. The coefficient
estimates in the fifth column of Table 10 suggest that the number and proportion
of issues in the next year alone can explain 70% of the optimism differences be-
tween local and foreign analysts. Insofar as optimistic analyst reports parlay into
future business for underwriters, this suggests that analysts correctly anticipate
changes in the issue volume and proportion, and adjust their recommendation op-
timism accordingly.25 More importantly, the positive and statistically significant
coefficients on the investment banking proxies one year ahead suggest that local
analysts increase their recommendation optimism more than foreign analysts in
response to anticipated increases in the issue volume, and that analysts based in
countries that capture a higher proportion of underwriting in the market are more
optimistic than others. In fact, the results in Table 10 indicate that the local ana-
lyst dummy in Table 3 only matters to the extent that it captures the higher levels
of investment banking business directed to local brokerages (see Table A1). This
provides clear and direct evidence relating investment banking pressures to the
delta in optimism between local and foreign analysts.
V. Conclusion
This study documents a unique and novel form of home bias. We show that
local analyst recommendations in emerging market stocks are more optimistic
than foreign analyst recommendations. This pattern of optimism is pervasive
across countries, time periods, small stocks, large stocks, value stocks, growth
stocks, index stocks, and non-index stocks, and persists even after controlling for
analyst affiliation.
It also has important implications for returns. On one hand, upgrades and
buy recommendations by foreign analysts convey more positive information than
upgrades and buy recommendations by local analysts. On the other hand, down-
grades and sell recommendations by local analysts convey more negative informa-
tion than downgrades and sell recommendations by foreign analysts. Yet, neither
sophisticated foreign investors nor local institutions fully account for the differ-
ences in optimism between local and foreign analysts. In particular, foreign in-
vestors trade, incorrectly, as if foreign analysts’ sells are more informative than
25Of course the causality could run the other way. That is, optimistic analyst reports parlay into
greater investment banking deal flow in the future. However the fact that we already include future
underwriter affiliation as one of the controls in the Table 10 regressions suggests that this is unlikely
to be the case.
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TABLE 10
Sensitivity of Recommendation Optimism to International Investment Banking Proxies
Pooled OLS regressions are estimated from January 1994 to December 2003 across all analyst recommendation/firm
observations in the sample at that time. The dependent variable is analyst recommendation minus this month’s median
recommendation. The independent variables are the local analyst dummy, the past affiliation dummy, the future affiliation
dummy, the local analyst dummy interacted with the number of issues in the firm’s country in a year (in thousands), the
proportion of equity issues underwritten by brokerages headquartered in the same country as the analyst’s brokerage, the
log of firm size, the number of firms covered by the analyst, the number of analysts covering the firm, the experience level
in years of the analyst, the number of analysts employed by the brokerage, and the full set of country and year dummies.
Observations with consensus generated with less than three observations are excluded from the analysis. Firms without
IPO/SEO lead underwriter information are also excluded from the analysis. The analysis includes both domestic and
international issues. The recommendation variable takes the following values: 3 = buy, 2 = hold, and 1 = sell. The past
affiliation dummy takes a value of 1 if the analyst belongs to a brokerage that was the lead or joint lead manager for the
firm’s IPO or SEO. It takes a value of 0 otherwise. The future affiliation dummy takes a value of 1 if the analyst belongs
to a brokerage that will be the lead or joint lead manager for the firm’s IPO or SEO. It takes a value of 0 otherwise. Only
the coefficients on the local analyst dummy, the affiliation dummies, and the investment banking variables are reported for
brevity. The number of observations for each regression is 64,537. The t-statistics derived using White (1980) standard
errors are in parentheses. ˆ = significant at the 10% level, * = significant at the 5% level, and ** = significant at the 1%
level.
Equation (4) Augmented with Affiliation Dummies
Independent Variable and Investment Banking Proxies
Local analyst dummy 0.095** 0.059** 0.071** 0.056** 0.031ˆ 0.080** 0.027 0.014
(6.26) (3.99) (4.15) (3.12) (1.75) (4.64) (1.57) (0.64)
Past affiliation dummy 0.053** 0.052** 0.050** 0.051** 0.050** 0.052** 0.050** 0.049**
(≤ ∞ years (3.19) (3.12) (3.02) (3.11) (3.03) (3.13) (3.00) (2.97)
post-IPO/SEO)
Future affiliation dummy 0.078** 0.075** 0.076** 0.075** 0.073** 0.078** 0.072** 0.072**
(≤ ∞ years (3.27) (3.13) (3.17) (3.13) (3.06) (3.24) (3.02) (3.01)
pre-IPO/SEO)
Local analyst dummy ∗ −0.016 −0.009 0.003
total number of issues (−1.17) (−0.51) (0.18)
in firm country (Y − 1)
Local analyst dummy ∗ 0.015 0.007 −0.010 −0.029
total number of issues (0.94) (0.42) (−0.39) (−1.12)
in firm country (Y)
Local analyst dummy ∗ 0.036* 0.052** 0.047*
total number of issues (2.34) (2.62) (2.36)
in firm country (Y + 1)
Proportion of issues 0.077** 0.028 0.020
underwritten (3.95) (1.28) (0.90)
by brokerages
in analyst country (Y − 1)
Proportion of issues 0.082** 0.081** 0.046* 0.048*
underwritten (4.20) (4.10) (2.06) (2.15)
by brokerages
in analyst country (Y)
Proportion of issues 0.092** 0.070** 0.069**
underwritten (4.70) (3.20) (3.00)
by brokerages
in analyst country (Y + 1)
their buys while local institutions trade, incorrectly, as if local analysts’ buys are
more informative than their sells.
The fact that emerging market stocks are typically underwritten by local bro-
kerages suggests that differences in investment banking pressure between local
and foreign underwriters may be at the root of the differences in recommenda-
tion optimism. We consider various competing explanations including brokerage
commission pressures, analyst reputation concerns, institutional presence, cur-
rency and country risk, familiarity bias, and underwriting-induced selection and
cognitive biases, but find no evidence to suggest that these explanations account
for the bulk of the optimism differences. In contrast, country-specific investment
banking proxies completely account for those optimism differences.
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The results suggest several avenues for future work. In studies on the classic
home bias, a better understanding of how local investors react to optimistic local
analyst recommendations may shed light on why local investors gravitate toward
local stocks. In studies on international investors, incorporating differences in
recommendation optimism between local and foreign analysts may help account
for differences in trading profits and apparent informational asymmetries between
local and foreign investors.
TABLE A1
Equity Issues in Emerging Markets
Table A1 shows the number of domestic equity issues for the eight emerging countries that we study. The sample period
is from January 1994 to December 2003. Lead underwriters are classified into local and foreign based on the locations of
their head offices. Only equity issues with underwriter information are included in the sample. Equity issues are classified
as Local Lead Underwriter issues if the sole managing underwriter is local or if there are no foreign underwriters among
the joint managing underwriters. All other issues are classified as Foreign Lead Underwriter issues.
Total Equity Issue Market Local Lead Underwriters Foreign Lead Underwriters
Country No. of Issues Cap (U.S.$bn) % (No.) % (Market Cap) % (No.) % (Market Cap)
India 1,166 3.43 97.43 90.82 2.57 9.18
Indonesia 212 3.95 78.77 69.67 21.23 30.34
Korea 881 51.23 96.37 95.61 3.29 4.29
Malaysia 946 14.49 97.67 96.65 2.22 3.31
Philippines 122 2.86 87.71 86.18 12.30 13.82
Singapore 564 10.82 80.85 72.82 18.97 26.97
Taiwan 501 18.69 98.80 99.78 1.20 0.22
Thailand 136 4.75 94.85 95.24 5.15 4.76
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